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Resource allocation decisions require information about individuals' preferences for goods 
and services. Survey based stated preference methods, such as discrete choice experiments 
(DCEs), are used to elicit preferences for non-market goods. A critique of stated preference 
research is that respondents to hypothetical surveys may not provide careful and thoughtful 
responses that reveal rational preferences. Choice certainty has been used to measure survey 
respondents' task engagement. Researchers assume that respondents who are certain about 
their choices provide deliberative responses. In the case of DCE, we argue that the variability 
of choice certainty is also important. We present a novel framework to identify thoughtful / 
deliberative respondents. The framework combines respondents’ certainty with their 
variability in certainty across a set of choice tasks. We test our framework empirically using 
data from two case studies. We find respondents with higher mean certainty and variability (i) 
seldom use decision heuristics, (ii) are more likely to have monotonic preferences, (iii) have 
longer response times, (iv) make choices that have higher interval validity, and (v) have 
higher choice consistency. We discuss the relevance of alternative ex-post calibration 
strategies with a view to improve the precision and accuracy of DCE-based welfare estimates.  
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Public decision making is often concerned with the provision of non-market goods, such as 
environmental amenities or health care services. These resource allocation decisions require 
information about individuals' preferences for the non-market good. Yet, in such settings there 
exists little or no market data from which to infer preferences. Survey based stated preference 
methods are used to elicit preferences for non-market goods (Boxall et al., 1996; Carson et al., 
2001). A popular stated preference method is the discrete choice experiment (DCE). DCEs 
describe the non-market good or service being valued by a set of attributes. The attributes are 
arranged into multi-attribute bundles, which are presented to individuals in choice sets of two 
or more bundles. The DCE task requires individuals to choose their preferred bundle. A 
criticism of stated preference research is that responses may differ from people’s real choices 
- this is called the hypothetical bias problem (Blumenschein et al., 2008, 2001; Morrison and 
Brown, 2009; Murphy and Stevens, 2004). A related critique is that choice tasks are difficult 
to complete and respondents may not engage with the task. In this context, individuals do not 
provide the deliberative responses necessary for rational decision-making (Loomis, 2011; 
Luchini and Watson, 2014).  
Survey respondents' task engagement has been measured by their choice certainty (Beck et 
al., 2013; Brouwer et al., 2010; Dekker et al., 2016; Lundhede et al., 2009; Olsen et al., 2011). 
Researchers assume that respondents who state they are certain about their decision have 
rational preferences and provide more reliable responses. As such, these respondents may be 
less subject to hypothetical bias and their choices are more consistent (Beck et al., 2016; Fifer 
et al., 2014; Ready et al., 2010). In this paper, we question this assumption and argue that 
respondents who are always certain about their choice in DCE tasks are more likely to make 
quick and intuitive decisions without much thought. Respondents who are engaged in the task 
and provide thoughtful responses will not always be certain about their decisions and their 
choice certainty will depend on the choices they face (Olsen et al., 2011; Sudman et al., 
1996). We present a novel framework to identify engaged respondents that combines 
respondents’ choice certainty with the variability in respondents’ choice certainty across a set 
of choice tasks. We test our framework empirically. We use respondents’ mean choice 
certainty and variability to separate respondents into two groups: quick (non-deliberative) 
processing and rational (deliberative) processing. Then, we test various conjectures that relate 
choice certainty patterns to the quality of DCE responses. 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of choice 
certainty in stated preference studies. Section 3 presents the theoretical link between choice 
certainty and deliberative thinking. Section 4 discusses our two case studies and provides 
details of our data. Our testable hypotheses on the link between deliberative thinking, choice 
certainty and certainty variability and empirical results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 
discusses the results and present future research avenues.  
 
2. Use of choice certainty in the stated preference literature 
Researchers have long recognised that when individuals are asked their monetary value of 
non-market goods in a contingent valuation method (CVM) survey they are likely to face 
uncertainty. This uncertainty arises because individuals are either unfamiliar with the good in 
question or unfamiliar with assessing their willingness to pay (WTP) or willingness to accept 
(WTA) compensation for a change in the good (Li and Mattsson, 1995; Wang, 1997). 
Consequently, researchers have asked respondents to state their degree of certainty about their 
WTP or to state the range within which their WTP lies2. One implicit assumption of this 
approach is that respondents know the range in which their true WTP lies. Therefore, 
respondents are certain they will or will not pay amounts below or above the range, but are 
uncertain about whether or not they are willing to pay amounts within the range3. A further 
assumption is that respondents who are most certain about their WTP provide more reliable 
responses. This assumption has been verified in studies that compare CVM-derived valuations 
with real payments and find a closer correspondence between valuations and payments when 
valuations are based only on the responses of the most certain respondents (Murphy et al., 
2005).  
Researchers have also used respondents’ choice certainty to calibrate CVM responses. This is 
done in two ways: 1) by recoding responses or 2) by re-weighting responses in empirical 
analysis based on choice certainty. In general, response recoding changes the data for 
                                                 
2
 Researchers have measured contingent valuation choice certainty in two ways: 1/ simultaneously with the CV 
responses or 2/ after respondents’ WTP has been elicited (post-choice certainty). The choice certainty question 
frame has become standardised, but researchers use a range of different response options including descriptive 
certainty scales (definitely sure, probably sure, not sure) and numerical certainty scales (ranging from 1 to 5, or 
from 1 to 10). Numerical certainty scales can be polar-point labelled scales in which the end-points (1 and 10) 
are given a descriptive label such as 1=very uncertain to 10=very certain, but the intermediate points are not. 
3 Loomis and Eksland 1998 and others find evidence of such a `u-shaped' relationship between the monetary 
amount and respondent certainty (Loomis and Ekstrand, 1998). 
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respondents who are uncertain about their response: respondents who are uncertain and state 
‘yes, I am willing to pay $x’ are re-coded as if they stated ‘no, I am not willing to pay 
$x’(Blumenschein et al., 2008). Studies that reweight the data place a greater empirical 
weight on respondents who are certain of their answer (Li and Mattsson, 1995; Martinez-
Espineira and Lyssenko, 2012). 
The findings from CVM studies have led researchers to elicit choice certainty alongside 
preferences in DCE tasks (Beck et al., 2016, 2013; Brouwer et al., 2010; Dekker et al., 2016; 
Fifer et al., 2014; Lundhede et al., 2009; Olsen et al., 2011; Regier et al., 2014). In these DCE 
studies, researchers usually assume that certain respondents are more engaged and provide 
more thoughtful responses. Ready et al (2010), Fifer et al (2014) and Beck et al (2016) 
investigate the relationship between certainty and hypothetical bias in DCE tasks. They 
hypothesise that more certain responses are less prone to hypothetical bias. The studies find 
mixed results. Ready et al (2010) recode responses that fail to meet a certainty threshold of 7 
(out of 10). They find close correspondents between hypothetical and real WTP after 
recoding. Fifer et al (2014) aggregate certainty across all the DCE tasks a respondent 
completes and calculate the respondents’ median certainty. They find that hypothetical WTP 
is higher than real WTP and that certain respondents (median certainty≥8) have lower 
hypothetical bias. Beck et al (2016) use choice certainty and compare the effect on 
hypothetical bias of either recoding or reweighting with a certainty threshold of 9 (out of 10). 
They find that recoding increases hypothetical bias and reweighting has no impact on 
hypothetical WTP and therefore hypothetical bias. Beck et al (2013) also compare the effect 
of different recoding and reweighting approaches on WTP, but do not have comparable data 
on real valuations. They find recoding and reweighting substantially reduces estimated WTP. 
Researchers have also tested the relationship between certainty and respondent engagement in 
DCE tasks by investigating the link between response certainty and consistency (Beck et al., 
2013; Dekker et al., 2016; Lundhede et al., 2009). These studies include choice task certainty 
as an explanatory variable of error variance in econometric models of respondents’ DCE 
choices. All studies find the higher choice task certainty is associated with higher choice 
consistency (i.e., with lower error variance). Researchers have also explored the determinants 
of choice task certainty, and in particular how choice task certainty is affected by the utility 
balance of the alternatives in the choice task (Brouwer et al, 2010; Olsen et al, 2011; Regier et 
al, 2014; Lundhede et al, 2009). All studies find that choice task certainty increases with the 
utility difference across alternatives in the task. Olsen et al (2011) interpret this as evidence 
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that response certainty measures preference certainty as proposed by Li and Mattsson (1995) 
and Wang (1997).  
 
3. Choice certainty and deliberative thinking: theoretical background 
Most researchers assume the relationship that holds between choice certainty and response 
quality in CVM tasks also holds for DCE tasks. But there is currently no theoretical 
framework that relates choice certainty to more reliable choices (Loomis, 2011). There are 
important differences between the CVM and DCE methods that affect the link between choice 
certainty and reliability (Olsen et al, 2011; Beck et al, 2013; Regier et al., 2014). CVM tasks 
ask respondents to report if their WTP for a good is above a stated monetary amount. In a 
CVM context, choice certainty contains information about whether the monetary amount lies 
within the range of respondents' WTP. DCE tasks ask respondents to choose one multi-
attribute good from a set of goods in which the monetary cost is one attribute. This task 
requires the respondent to assess for each good if their monetary value (WTP or WTA) for the 
described bundle is higher or lower than the monetary cost. In the case that respondents are 
willing to pay for both goods, they then have to assess which good provides the highest 
utility.  
In a DCE, choice certainty contains information about whether the respondents is able to 
distinguish between the utility of the two or more alternatives (Olsen et al, 2011; Lundhede et 
al., 2009). Some choice sets will include alternatives that provide very different utilities. In 
this situation, the alternatives are easy to distinguish, and therefore respondents are likely to 
be certain about their choice. While in other choice sets all the alternatives may have a similar 
utility. In this situation, the alternatives are hard to distinguish, and respondents are likely to 
be uncertain about their choice (Olsen et al, 2011; Regier et al., 2014). We should expect 
respondents’ certainty to vary across tasks. Respondents who are engaged with the task and 
who provide reliable responses will in some choice sets be certain of their choice (when one 
alternative dominates all others) and in other choice sets be uncertain about their choice. 
Regier et al (2014) find that respondents who are uncertain about their decision reveal more 
precise information about their preferences in the choices that they make. 
The conceptual link between response certainty, task complexity, and imprecise preference 
data is supported in the judgement and decision-making literature (Kahneman, 2003; Simon, 
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1990, 1979; Stanovich and West, 2000). Stanovich and West (2000) and Kahneman (2003) 
suggest a dual-process theory of decisional thinking. Respondents who make intuitive choices 
without much thought are using System 1 processing, which is associated with errors of 
intuition. These errors include heuristics of accessibility, which is the amount of effort with 
which thoughts come to mind. Task complexity may induce System 1 thinking, which can act 
as a computational escape hatch for respondents who find the tasks too difficult to complete 
rationally. Our assertion is that System 1 processing may lead to less informative and noisier 
choices.  
Simon (1990) suggests that choices are shaped by the task environment and individuals’ 
computational capabilities. The task environment includes the complexity of the task (Simon, 
1979) while computational capability accounts for an ‘information-processing cognitive 
architecture’. This architecture includes short- and long-term memory and a ‘production 
system’ capable of problem-solving and learning from new information (Simon, 1990). 
Kahneman (2003) similarly states: “the accessibility of a thought is determined jointly by the 
characteristics of the cognitive mechanism that produce it and by the characteristics of the 
stimuli and events that evoke it” (p.699). As such, the choice task that creates the stimuli can 
work together with System 1 or System 2 type processing (or the cognitive mechanism or 
processing architecture) to influence the ease of a thought or judgment. These assertions leave 
scope for task complexity differently affecting respondents employing System 1 or System 2 
type processing when completing choice tasks. Respondents who engage in System 1 
processing may be less deliberative in their responses (a result of complexity), less likely to 
experience task complexity and less likely to be uncertain about their choices. System 2 
thinkers who use all of the information in the choice set experience task complexity. As a 
consequence, their level of certainty should vary during the choice experiment as a result of 
varying task complexity (Swait and Adamowicz, 2001). 
In this paper, we propose that in addition to response certainty, what matters to identify 
thoughtful responses is certainty variability across choice tasks. Previous studies have 
considered response certainty at the choice task level and have ignored potentially useful 
information contained in the variability of certainty across the tasks completed by the same 
individual. We argue that respondents' certainty variability across choices contains useful 
information about respondents’ task engagement. Respondent’s choice certainty should differ 
across the different choice sets if they are involved in the task, i.e. if they engage in 
deliberative rather than intuitive thinking. This assumption is supported by previous literature 
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showing that choice task difficulty varies because of varying choice complexity, which 
subsequently affects stated choice certainty (Olsen et al., 2011; Regier et al., 2014; Swait and 
Adamowicz, 2001). As a consequence of varying difficulty, picking the alternative with 
highest perceived utility is more cognitively demanding in more complex choice tasks 
(Louviere et al., 2008) and respondents’ stated certainty decreases (Regier et al., 2014). In line 
with these results, we posit that respondents who are always certain or uncertain of their 
choices across the experiment are actually putting less deliberative effort into answering the 
choice questions and thus provide lower quality data. In the next section we present two case 
studies used to test our assumptions.  
 
4. The two case studies 
Our empirical analysis is based on two case studies that use a DCE to elicit individuals’ 
preferences for non-market goods and also collect post choice certainty after each choice task. 
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of each study. 
4.1.Women’s preferences for breast cancer screening 
This study used a DCE to elicit women’s preferences and trade-offs between the benefits and 
risks of breast cancer screening. The data were collected in 2016 using an online survey of 
812 women between 40 and 74 years of age and living in France (Sicsic et al., 2018). Breast 
cancer screening was described by seven attributes: 1) breast cancer mortality risk (10, 15, 20, 
25, 30 deaths out of 1,000 women followed during 25 years); 2) false-positive mammography 
risk (0, 50, 100, 150, 200 false-positive results out of 1,000 women tested); 3) over-diagnosis 
risk (0, 10, 50, 100, 150 over-diagnosed cases out of 1,000 women tested); 4) type of 
screening referral (the local screening centre or the doctor); 5) travel time (0 minutes, 10 
minutes, 30 minutes, 60 minutes, 90 minutes); 6) total number of tests over a lifetime (0, 6, 
12, 18, 24), and 7) out of pocket cost (€0, €30, €60, €60 refunded later). A main effects D-
efficient design was used to generate the choice tasks. In each choice task, the women had to 
choose between two screening alternatives and an opt-out option in which the levels were 
always the same. An example choice task is provided in Appendix A. The survey included 16 
choice tasks, which were blocked to two questionnaire versions each with eight choice tasks. 
Respondents were randomly allocated to one questionnaire version and the order of choice 
tasks was randomly varied across respondents. One additional choice task was added to the 
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questionnaire. This task was designed to test the monotonicity of preferences (i.e. the ability 
to choose a dominant alternative within a specific choice task). In the choice task testing for 
monotonicity, the dominant alternative included better levels for the first three attributes (i.e. 
lower breast cancer mortality, lower false-positive and over diagnosis risk) and equal levels of 
the four other attributes compared to the dominated screening alternative.  
For each choice task, response certainty was elicited using a 10 polar point labelled Likert 
scale (0= “very uncertain”, 10 = “very certain”) and response time was measured 
automatically within the online survey. 
4.2. Preferences for the return of incidental genomic findings  
This study used a DCE to elicit citizen’s preferences for the return of incidental genomic 
findings (Regier et al, 2015). The data were collected in 2014 using an online survey of 1200 
Canadian citizens over 18 years of age. The DCE included five attributes: 1) risk of 
developing the disease(s) at some point in the future (5% lifetime risk or higher, 40% lifetime 
risk or higher, 80% lifetime risk or higher, 90% lifetime risk or higher); 2) disease treatability 
(no effective medical treatment or lifestyle change, recommended effective lifestyle change 
only, recommended effective medical treatment only, recommended effective medical 
treatment and lifestyle change); 3) disease severity (mild, moderate, severe, or very severe 
health consequences); 4) information on carrier status (yes, no); and 5) cost of receiving the 
results ($425, $750, $1000, $1500). Questionnaires were in French or English. The 
experimental design used D-efficient procedures to maximize the statistical efficiency of the 
statistical model (Regier et al., 2015). The approach resulted in 80 choice tasks. Each subject 
was randomly assigned to one of five blocks that included 16 choice tasks. An example 
choice task is in Appendix A.  
Each choice task included two testing options and a “no information” (opt-out) option. For 
each choice task, certainty level on a 10 point Likert scale (0= “very uncertain”, 10 = “very 




5. Linking mean choice certainty and variability to survey response 
quality 
 
5.1.Taxonomy of choice certainty and set of testable assumptions 
In this section, we propose a certainty classification and a set of testable assumptions about 
the relationship between choice certainty and variability and deliberative thinking. We 
partition respondents into three certainty classes based on their mean choice certainty (see 
Table 2). Our thresholds for categorising certain respondents are consistent with groupings 
used in the literature (Blumenschein et al., 2008; Li and Mattsson, 1995; Loomis and 
Ekstrand, 1998). First, respondents with an average choice certainty strictly above 8 (on the 0 
to 10 certainty scale) are considered to have offered relatively certain answers. Second, 
respondents with an average choice certainty below 6 are considered to have offered relatively 
uncertain answers. Third, respondents with a mean certainty between 6 and 8 (included) are 
considered hesitant.  
We further partition respondents within these classes into two smaller groups based on 
observed certainty variability, as measured by the standard deviation in certainty over the 
sequence of choices: the “constantly-” prefixed group denotes respondents with strictly lower 
certainty variability compared to the average of their class, and the “variably-” prefixed group 
denotes respondents with higher certainty variability compared to the average of their class.  
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of our six-group certainty classification in both case 
studies. The variably uncertain (VU) group represents the smallest proportion of the sample 
(i.e., 9.6% in study 1 and 7.8% in study 2), and the constantly hesitant (CH) group has largest 
sample size (22.0% and 24.2%, respectively). Table 3 further describes the choice certainty 
distributions in the two case studies. As expected, the standard deviation, range, and 95% 
intervals of the certainty scores are systematically higher in the subgroups having higher 
certainty variability compared to the groups with lower certainty variability. 
This partition reflects our assumption that both mean certainty and the variability in certainty 
contain useful information about respondents’ engagement in the choice tasks, i.e. their use of 
deliberative versus intuitive thinking. Deliberative thinking cannot be directly inferred from 
the data, therefore we proxy it by various indicators of data quality. We posit that respondents 
using deliberative thinking provide higher data quality, that is, they provide more accurate and 
precise information about their preferences. Following previous research (e.g., Beck et al., 
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2013, 2016; Brouwer et al., 2010; Lundhede et al., 2009), we first assume that individuals 
using deliberative thinking should be engaged enough in the task to be sufficiently certain of 
their choices, thus the uncertain (CU and VU groups) are more likely to provide low (or 
moderate4) quality data (H1). Furthermore we assume that only individuals with sufficient 
certainty variability complete the DCE tasks with a high level of deliberative thinking (H2). 
This assumption directly follows on from the theoretical framework presented in section 3. 
Therefore the variably hesitant (VH) and variability certain (VC) groups are assumed to have 
provided the highest quality data. On the contrary, we assume that individuals who are always 
certain of their choices (e.g., the constantly certain) are less likely to have engaged in the task 
and are thus likely to provide lower quality data.  
We test the relevance of our certainty classification based on five conjectures that connect 
respondents’ choice behaviour in the DCE to data quality indicators that are indicative of 
deliberative thinking.  
Conjecture 1: The constantly uncertain (CU), constantly hesitant (CH) and constantly 
certain (CC) groups are more likely to adopt simplifying choice heuristics such as always 
selecting the same alternative across the choice tasks (e.g., the status quo)5.  
Rationale. According to assumption H2, low certainty variability is associated with 
fast intuitive thinking, i.e. higher likelihood of adopting simplifying choice heuristics, 
such as deterministic choice patterns. 
Conjecture 2: The variably hesitant (VH) and variably certain (VC) groups use more rational 
decision behaviour and therefore are more likely to hold monotonic preferences. 
Rationale. A monotonic preference, which is defined as the ability to adopt utility 
maximizing rules, is an indicator of rational decision-making. According to 
assumption H1 and H2, only respondents with a sufficient level of certainty and 
certainty variability are assumed to engage in rational (deliberative) thinking. 
                                                 
4 We recognize that our assumption is less clear for the variably uncertain (VU) group because individuals in this 
group are on average uncertain but at times offer relatively more certain responses.  
5 The process of always choosing the status quo option (i.e., serial non-participation) may be explained by 
different factors including (but not limited to) protest responses or lexicographical preferences (Haefen et al., 
2005). We assume that people who always make the same decision whatever the content of the choice set are 
more likely to adopt simplifying choice heuristics. This is consistent with previous theoretical and empirical 
analyses (Dekker et al., 2016; Loomes et al., 2009; Swait and Adamowicz, 2001). While non-demanding 
behaviour is consistent with consumer theory, always choosing the status quo (or any other alternative) in 
repeated choice experiments can lead to unidentified preference parameters in standard random utility theory 
(RUT) models. RUT is not meant to deal with completely deterministic choices.  
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Conjecture 3: The variably hesitant (VH) and variably certain (VC) groups offer more 
considered choices and therefore have longer response times. 
Rationale. By definition, deliberative thinking is associated with slow decision 
making. In a DCE context, one needs sufficient time to compute each alternative’s 
utility and then to pick the alternative with highest perceived utility. Previous studies 
support the assumption of a link between response time and cognitive effort in the 
context of online surveys (Borger, 2016; Uggeldahl et al., 2016). Moreover, using eye-
tracking methods, it was shown that more time is needed to process more complicated 
attributes (Krucien et al., 2017). 
Conjecture 4: The choices of the variably hesitant (VH) and variably certain (VC) groups 
have higher internal validity (i.e., logical consistency). 
Rationale. Internal validity reflects choice behaviours in line with a priori 
assumptions, where individuals are expected to behave rationally. According to 
assumption H1 and H2, only respondent with a sufficient level of certainty and 
certainty variability are assumed to engage in rational (deliberative) thinking. 
Conjecture 5: In econometric models of choices, the variably hesitant and variably certain 
groups have a higher scale (i.e. lower error variance) as an indicator of higher choice 
consistency.  
Rationale. In discrete choice models, scale is related to choice consistency: higher scale is 
associated with lower error variance and is an indicator of higher choice consistency 
(DeShazo and Fermo, 2002; Hensher et al., 1998). Individuals who make more consistent 
choices are more likely to engage in deliberative thinking.  
5.2. Empirical testing of behavioural assumptions 
5.2.1 Choice certainty and use of simplifying heuristics (conjecture 1) 
We measure respondents use of simplifying choice heuristics when completing the DCE tasks 
using two indicators: 1) serial non-trading behaviour in which individuals always select the 
same “testing” option (i.e., option A or option B) across the choice tasks and 2) serial non-
demanding behaviour in which individuals always choose the “no testing” (i.e., opt-out) 
option across the choice tasks.  
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The association between the certainty groups and the use of decision heuristics is presented in 
Table 4. In case study 1, the results of Fishers’ exact test show that there is a significant 
relationship between certainty groups and respondents being either a serial non-trader 
(p<0.0001) or serial non-demander (p<0.0001). We find that serial non-trading behaviour is 
more prevalent among the constantly uncertain (CU) respondents (10.2% against 3.3% 
overall), and serial non-demanding behaviour is more prevalent among constantly certain 
(CC) respondents (17.5% against 6.2% overall). Constantly certain respondents account for 
58% of all serial non-demanders in the sample. These results provide empirical support for 
conjecture 1. 
In case study 2, only 4 respondents (0.3%) are serial non-traders thus this indicator is not 
considered in the empirical analysis (statistical tests not computed). We find that constantly 
certain (CC) respondents are significantly more likely to be serial non demanders (51.1% 
against 18.3% overall, p<0.0001). These results provide partial empirical support for 
conjecture 1. 
 
5.2.2. Choice certainty and monotonicity of preferences (conjecture 2) 
In case study 1, we test the monotonicity of preferences using an additional choice task that 
included a dominant alternative with ‘better’ levels for the first three attributes (i.e. lower 
breast cancer mortality, lower false-positive and over diagnosis risk) compared to the 
alternative screening option. The results of the monotonicity test stratified by certainty groups 
are shown in Table 5 (case study 1 only). The respondents with higher certainty variability are 
more likely to have monotonic preferences than respondents with lower certainty variability 
(p<0.0001). This is particularly true for variably hesitant (VH) and variably certain (VC) 
respondents: in these two groups, respectively 90.3% and 94.7% pass the test, versus 83.0% 
of respondents overall. This result provides empirical support for conjecture 26.  
 
5.2.3. Choice certainty and response time (conjecture 3) 
                                                 
6 Note that the strong prevalence of serial non-demanders among the constantly certain (CC) group may explain 
why this group performs poorly in the monotonicity test, as serial non-demanders systematically fail to choose 
the dominant screening alternative in the monotonicity test.  
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Two indicators are used to analyse the association between choice certainty patterns and 
response time: 1) median response time to the questionnaire7 and 2) the proportions of 
“speeders” (or “professional respondents”) defined as respondents who rushed through the 
questionnaire without sufficiently considering the information provided (Borger, 2016). For 
both studies, a completion time of no less than 15-20 minutes was expected based on 
information provided from the pilot surveys. Therefore, a total response time strictly below 10 
minutes was used as a cut-off to identify the so-called “speeders”, who represented 16.8% 
(study 1) and 17.8% (study 2) of the sample. 
The results are presented in Table 5. In both studies, we find the median response time per 
choice task is significantly higher for the groups with high certainty variability compared to 
the groups with lower certainty variability (p<0.0001). For instance the variably certain (VC) 
respondents have a median response time of 15.8 minutes (study 1) and 17.2 minutes (study 
2), compared with 13.9 minutes (study 1) and 13.8 minutes (study 2), for the constantly 
certain (CC) group. In both studies, the proportion of “speeders” is higher among the 
subgroups with both low mean certainty and low certainty variability. For instance, in the 
constantly uncertain (CU) group, 27.4% (study 1) and 23.0% (study 2) have response times 
below 10 minutes, compared with 9.2% (study 1) and 11.8% (study 2) in the variably certain 
(VC) group. These results provide strong empirical support for conjecture 3.  
5.2.4. Choice certainty and internal validity (conjecture 4) 
We assess internal validity of the choices made by respondents in each certainty group by 
estimating i) stratified multinomial logit (MNL) models and ii) stratified mixed multinomial 
logit (MXL) models to describe the choice of each of the six certainty groups. In the MNL 
model, preferences are assumed homogeneous and thus all parameters of the utility function 
are fixed. This assumption is relaxed by fitting MXL models, assuming normally distributed 
random coefficients for all attributes. Moreover, the MXL includes a random generic intercept 
(𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐴|𝐵) as follows:  
𝑈𝑛𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑛𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐴|𝐵 + 𝛽𝑛
′𝑥𝑗𝑡 + 𝜖𝑛𝑗𝑡     (1)    
 
                                                 
7 We use response time to the entire questionnaire because this was the only information available in both case 
studies. Median response time is used instead of the mean because it attenuates the impact of extreme response 
times that could be negatively associated with data quality. Indeed, in a similar study context (i.e. an online 
survey) Borger (2016) finds a non-linear relationship between response time and choice randomness. 
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As 𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐴|𝐵 enters the utility function of the two testing (i.e. non opt-out) alternatives, it 
introduces correlation across these alternatives thus relaxing the independence from irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA) assumption (Train, 2003). Second, it accounts for serial non-demanding 
behaviours such as individuals who are always choosing to opt-out (𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐴|𝐵 ≪ 0). Thus, 
the results of the MXL may be more robust to possible confounding between constant 
reporting of high certainty and serial non-demanding. More generally, results of the MXL 
models may be more robust to potential confounding between choice certainty and preference 
heterogeneity8.  
The results of the MNL and MXL models are used to compute the proportion of estimated 
preference parameters that are in line with a-priori hypotheses9. In case study 1, all the 
quantitative attributes (i.e., mortality, false-positive risk, overdiagnosis risk, travel time, 
number of tests) are expected to have a negative impact on the utility derived from the 
screening programme. We have no a priori expectation about the impact of doctors’ 
prescription as compared to receiving an invitation letter from the local screening centre, 
therefore, this parameter is not considered in the internal validity assessment. In total, there 
are six attributes (corresponding to eight preference parameters, because the cost attribute is 
categorical) for which we have a priori assumptions with respect to the sign of the coefficient. 
Our a priori expectations are that women will prefer a screening service with lower risks of 1) 
mortality, 2) false-positive results, 3) over-diagnosis, with 4) a shorter travel time, 5) lower 
number of lifetime tests, and 6) lower out-of-pocket cost. 
In case study 2, there are five attributes (four of which are included as categorical variables), 
corresponding to a total of ten preference parameters for which we have a priori assumptions 
with respect to the sign of the coefficient. Our a-priori expectations are that individuals will 
prefer a test when: 1) they have a higher probability of developing a disease in future, 2) there 
are effective treatments for the disease, 3) the disease is moderately severe or severe, 4) they 
receive information on carrier status and 5) the cost is lower.  
Table 6 reports the number and percentage of coefficients that are in line with a-priori 
assumptions in the two case studies. The results of the stratified MNL and MXL models on 
                                                 
8 As noted by an anonymous reviewer, if a respondent   has strong feelings about some alternatives or their 
features, she might find it easy to make the hypothetical choices and always report high certainty. In other words, 
there is possible confounding between choice certainty (and variability) and preference heterogeneity. Estimation 
of MXL models allows better accounting for this issue. If confounding exists, we expect the association between 
choice certainty patterns and internal validity to be less strong in MXL compared to MNL models. 
9 In both datasets, all the qualitative attributes are effects coded. 
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which these tests are based are provided in Appendix B (Table B1 to B4). In case study 1, in 
each certainty class, the internal validity is systematically higher for individuals with higher 
certainty variability. The choices of the variably hesitant (VH) and variably certain (VC) 
groups have the highest internal validity (100% of preference parameters have the expected 
sign in MNL models) whereas the choices of the constantly uncertain (CU) and constantly 
certain (CC) groups have the lowest internal validity (respectively 50% and 63% of 
preference parameters have the expected sign in the MNL models). In the MXL models, the 
internal validity is more similar across the six certainty classes. The results are consistent with 
those from the MNL and show our results are robust to potential confounding between choice 
certainty and preference heterogeneity: the choices of the variably hesitant (VH) and variably 
certain (VC) groups have 100% internal validity, versus 50% for the constantly uncertain 
(CU) and 88% for the constantly certain (CC) groups. Overall, our results provide empirical 
support for conjecture 4. 
In case study 2, the six classes display less heterogeneity in terms of internal validity as 
compared to case study 1. The choices of the constantly uncertain (CU) group exhibit lowest 
internal validity (70% in the MNL model and 80% in the MXL model). The choices of the 
variably hesitant (VH) and variably certain (VC) groups have the highest internal validity 
(respectively 100% and 90% in the MNL model, and 100% in the MXL model). In 
comparison, the choices of the constantly certain (CC) exhibit lower internal validity in the 
MNL model (80%), but similar consistency in the MXL model (100%). Overall, these results 
provide less strong but still consistent evidence supporting conjecture 4. 
5.2.5. Choice certainty and choice consistency (conjecture 5) 
We estimate heteroskedastic (or scaled) multinomial logit models (HMNL/SMNL) to 
investigate the relationship between choice certainty and choice consistency. The HMNL 
allows for unequal variances across individuals (DeShazo and Fermo, 2002; Hensher et al., 
1998). The utility function is specified as follows: 
𝑈𝑛𝑗𝑡 = 𝜇𝑛𝛽
′𝑥𝑗𝑡 + 𝜖𝑛𝑗𝑡    (2) 
In equation (2), 𝑈𝑛𝑗𝑡 is the utility that respondent n derives from alternative j in choice 
situation t, 𝑥𝑗𝑡 is the vector of attributes levels for alternative j in choice situation t, 𝛽
′ is the 
vector of preference weights to be estimated, 𝜖𝑛𝑗𝑡 is an error term assumed iid Gumbel, and 
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𝜇𝑛 is a function of individual characteristics assumed to influence the magnitude of the scale 
parameter. This scale function is parameterised as 𝜇𝑛 = exp (𝑍𝑛𝛾) where 𝑍𝑛 is a vector of 
individual characteristics and 𝛾 is a vector of parameters reflecting the influence of those 
characteristics on the scale (Hole, 2006). As the scale is inversely related to the variance of 
the error term, any characteristic having a positive (respectively, negative) impact on 𝜇𝑛 can 
be interpreted as associated to higher (respectively, lower) choice consistency (DeShazo and 
Fermo, 2002; Brouwer et al., 2010).  
We estimate five HMNL models using the following individual characteristics as predictors 
of the error variance function:  
- M1) Choice certainty at the task level (Dekker et al., 2016; Lundhede et al., 2009); 
- M2) Total response time (Borger, 2016; Uggeldahl et al., 2016); 
- M3) Five effect-coded indicators of certainty group membership (with the constantly 
hesitant group omitted for model identification); 
- M4) Mean certainty and certainty variability (both mean-centred); 
- M5) Mean certainty and certainty variability (mean-centred) plus an interaction term 
between mean certainty and certainty variability.  
Models 1 and 2 are standard in the literature and thus are used as benchmarks. Model 3 
directly aims at testing our conjecture 5. Models 4 and 5 aim to test additional assumptions. In 
M4, we test whether there is a linear relationship between choice consistency and mean 
certainty and certainty variability. In M5, we test the assumption that the relationship between 
choice certainty and deliberative thinking is moderated by the level of certainty variability. 
This model can be viewed as more flexible than M3, as it includes continuous (rather than 
categorical) effects. We expect a positive and significant effect of the interaction term on 
scale. 
Table 7 reports the results of the HMNL models (M1 to M5) estimated in case study 1. M1 
and M2 show that choice certainty and response time do not have a statistically significant 
impact on scale10, and the model fit (log-likelihood) is unchanged after their inclusion. M3 
shows that indicators based on our proposed certainty group partition have a statistically 
significant effect on scale and the model goodness of fit improves. The constantly uncertain 
and constantly certain groups have lower scale (higher response errors), i.e. lower choice 
                                                 
10 The results remain unchanged when we include response time at the choice task level or the log of response 
time in order to attenuate the effect of extreme response times. 
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consistency. Conversely, the variably hesitant (VH) and variably certain (VC) groups have 
significantly higher scale indicating higher choice consistency. These results provide 
empirical support for conjecture 5. 
In M4, only certainty variability has a positive and significant impact on scale 
(p<0.0001). In M5, as expected, there is a positive and significant interaction between mean 
certainty and certainty variability. This result validates the assumption that certainty 
variability moderates in the relationship between choice certainty and choice consistency. M5 
has the highest goodness of fit, suggesting that a flexible, continuous representation of 
deliberative thinking could be better than the discrete representation as assumed in M3 using 
the six-class partition. 
The results of the HMNL models estimated in case study 2 are reported in Table 8. In line 
with previous study results (Borger, 2016; Uggeldahl et al., 2016), response time has a 
positive and significant impact on scale. In line with case study 1, choice certainty (at the task 
level) does not have a statistically significant impact on scale. In M3, the constantly certain 
(CC) group has lower scale whereas the variably hesitant (VH) and variably certain (VC) 
groups have significantly higher scale. These results provide empirical support for conjecture 
5. In M4, higher mean certainty is negatively associated with choice consistency. However, 
the effect disappears when interacting mean certainty with certainty variability in M5. In line 
with case study 1, we find a positive and significant interaction between mean certainty and 





                                                 
11 Note that estimation of models accounting for both scale and preference heterogeneity can be achieved within 
the Generalized multinomial logit (GMNL) modelling framework. This model is controversial because scale and 
preference heterogeneity are confounded in discrete choice models as shown in Hess and Rose (2012). For this 
reason, we cannot allow for preference heterogeneity while estimating determinants of scale heterogeneity, 
because it would raise identification issues. 
19 
 
6. Discussion and extensions 
In this paper, we proposed a novel framework to identify engaged, deliberate respondents in 
discrete choice experiments. The framework combined respondents’ choice certainty with the 
variability in respondents’ choice certainty across a set of choice tasks. We tested behavioural 
assumptions derived from the theoretical framework using two DCE datasets collected in 
different contexts. We found respondents with higher certainty variability seldom used 
decision heuristics, were more likely to have monotonic preferences, and had longer response 
times. We also found that econometric models of these respondent’s choices had higher 
internal validity and lower error variance.  
Information on choice certainty variability may be useful to improve the precision and 
accuracy of DCE-based welfare estimates. One way to do this is within an ex-post calibration 
framework similar to those that use choice certainty. The scaling approach has been the most 
used empirically (Beck et al., 2013; Brouwer et al., 2010; Fifer et al., 2014; Lundhede et al., 
2009). Researchers estimate a scaled (or heteroskedastic) multinomial logit models (HMNL) 
and include the choice certainty as parameter of the scale function. The aim is to down-weight 
uncertain responses (Brouwer et al., 2010; Lundhede et al., 2009). We show in section 5.2.5. 
that the HMNL model can be extended to incorporate both mean choice certainty and 
certainty variability. However, if preference heterogeneity and choice certainty and certainty 
variability are confounded then down weighting responses with low variability may bias the 
results. This approach requires econometric advances that allow discrete choice models to 
separately identify scale and preference heterogeneity (Hess and Rose, 2012). 
An alternative approach is to directly re-weight respondents in the likelihood function (Regier 
et al, 2014). The aim is the same as the scaling approach: to increase efficiency by down-
weighing observations with high variance. In Appendix C, we show how this approach can be 
applied with certainty variability. We estimate weighted error components logit models and 
account for some preference heterogeneity in the alternative specific constants. We find 
reweighting in favour of respondents with higher mean certainty decreased the precision and 
plausibility of the welfare estimates. We find that including certainty variability in the re-
weighting function improved the results. Further research is needed to investigate how this 
approach can be extended to incorporate preference heterogeneity for all attributes. For 
instance, if a mixed logit framework is used several questions remain: i) should parameters be 
estimated in preference or WTP-space? ii) which distributions should be chosen for random 
20 
 
parameters (e.g., normal, lognormal, triangular)? iii) which type of estimation methods - 
simulated maximum likelihood or Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) ? and iv) 
which statistics should be reported for accuracy (mean or median WTP) and precision 
(standard errors or standard deviations) of welfare estimates?  
When designing DCE studies, researchers aim to present respondents with choice sets that 
elicit the maximum amount of information about respondents’ preferences. Researchers often 
aim to maximise the overall statistical efficiency by balancing utility of the alternatives 
presented in a choice task using prior preference information estimated from a pilot study 
(Greiner et al., 2014; Sándor and Wedel, 2001). However this approach increases task 
complexity for respondents (Swait and Adamowicz, 2001; Viney et al., 2005) and decreases 
response certainty (Regier et al., 2014). Our results suggest if researchers then reweight data 
toward certain respondents they may lose some of the efficiency gain provided by their 
experimental design.  
While reweighting places more emphasis on respondents engaged in deliberative thinking, it 
may compromise the representativeness of the results by down-weighting some respondents. 
Many studies include rationality tests and other measures of data quality and researchers may 
remove individuals who fail these tests from the analysis. Reweighting is similar but all 
individuals are retained. In both cases, data on actual choices are needed to allow researchers 
to test whether focussing on the responses of more engaged respondents increases the 
accuracy if welfare estimates.  
We encourage future research to investigate the determinants of choice certainty variability 
and in particular, whether and how it is related to the experimental design (e.g., inclusion of a 
status quo or opt-out option), to the complexity of the choice tasks (number of attributes, 
number of choice options) and to the use of particular decision heuristics. For instance, we 
found that one heuristic (serial non-trading) was frequently used by “constantly uncertain” 
individuals while the other (serial non-demanding) was frequently used by “constantly 
certain” respondents. Intuitively, we may assume that “constantly uncertain” respondents 
have either i) not well-formed preferences or ii) cognitive difficulties in answering the choice 
questions. This is consistent with the interpretation of choice uncertainty in other studies (see 
e.g., Dekker et al, 2016). Therefore, these respondents may not want to spend much time 
answering the questions (we find that they have lower response times) thus explaining they 
systematically choose the same option. On the contrary, we may assume that "constantly 
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certain" respondents have well-constructed preferences, i.e. strong feelings about some 
alternatives or their features, and find it easy to make the hypothetical choices such as 
systematically rejecting the cancer screening or genetic testing alternative12.  
 
Conclusion 
We showed that higher certainty is associated with higher deliberative thinking only for 
individuals who vary in their certainty during completion of the choice experiment. In other 
words, certainty variability is a key variable to consider for optimal ex-post calibration of 
respondents’ choices. We suggest applied researchers should use a certainty index in their 
reweighting function only if it is interacted with certainty variability. Further research is 
needed on the specification of econometric models incorporating information on choice 
certainty and variability and how it improves the precision and accuracy of welfare estimates 
in various contexts (e.g. valuation of health, environmental, or transportation amenities). 
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Table 1  
Summary of the two case studies 
Characteristics Case study 1   Case study 2  
Setting France   Canada 
Topic Breast cancer screening   Genomic sequencing 
Language French   English / French 
Respondents Women (age 40-74 years)   Citizens (age 18+ years) 
Sample size 812   1200 
Choice tasks per respondent 8 (+1)   16 
Response certainty scale 0 to 10   0 to 10 
Response time  yes   yes 





Taxonomy of choice certainty  
Group label 
Choice certainty 






Constantly uncertain (CU) <=6 < σuncertain   low low 
Variably uncertain (VU) <=6 >= σuncertain   low/moderate low/moderate 
Constantly hesitant (CH) ]6 ; 8] < σhesitant   low low 
Variably hesitant (VH) ]6 ; 8] >= σhesitant   high high 
Constantly certain (CC) >8 < σcertain   low low 
Variably certain (VC) >8 >= σcertain   high high 
 
Note: σ denotes the mean certainty standard deviation of a class. For instance, σuncertain is the mean SD 







Descriptive statistics of the certainty groups 
Certainty group 
Case study 1   Case study 2 
(Breast cancer screening)   (Genomic sequencing) 
Sample size   Certainty distribution   Sample size   Certainty distribution 
N %   Mean SD Range [95% CI]ᵃ   N %   Mean SD Range [95% CI]ᵃ 
Constantly uncertain (CU) 113 13.9%   4.97 0.98 [1 to 8] [3 to 6]   126 10.5%   4.50 1.63 [0 to 7] [0 to 6] 
Variably uncertain (VU) 78 9.6%   4.87 1.93 [0 to 10] [1 to 8]   94 7.8%   5.10 1.91 [0 to 10] [2 to 8] 
Constantly hesitant (CH) 179 22.0%   7.30 0.75 [5 to 9] [6 to 8]   290 24.2%   7.19 0.78 [5 to 10] [6 to 8] 
Variably hesitant (VH) 145 17.9%   7.17 1.52 [0 to 10] [5 to 10]   215 17.9%   7.05 1.64 [0 to 10] [4 to 9] 
Constantly certain (CC) 166 20.4%   9.31 0.74 [7 to 10] [8 to 10]   264 22.0%   9.33 0.62 [7 to 10] [8 to 10] 
Variably certain (VC) 131 16.2%   8.82 1.28 [0 to 10] [6 to 10]   211 17.6%   8.64 1.16 [0 to 10] [7 to 10] 
Overall 812 100%   7.38 1.97 [0 to 10] [4 to 10]   1200 100%   7.44 1.99 [0 to 10] [4 to 10] 
 





Test of conjecture 1: Choice certainty and deterministic choice patterns  
Certainty group 
Serial non-traders   Serial non-demanders 
Case study 1 Case study 2 Case study 1 Case study 2 
N % N %   N % N % 
Constantly uncertain (CU) 12 10.2% 0 0.0%   6 5.3% 27 21.4% 
Variably uncertain (VU) 4 5.1% 0 0.0%   1 1.3% 5 5.3% 
Constantly hesitant (CH) 8 4.5% 2 0.93%   12 6.7% 25 8.6% 
Variably hesitant (VH) 1 0.7% 1 0.34%   1 0.7% 5 2.3% 
Constantly certain (CC) 1 0.6% 1 0.38%   29 17.5% 135 51.1% 
Variably certain (VC) 1 0.8% 0 0.0%   1 0.8% 23 10.9% 
                    
Fisher’ exact test (p-value) p<0.0001         p<0.0001   p<0.0001   





Table 5  
Tests of conjectures 2 and 3: Choice certainty, monotonicity of preferences, and response time 
  Monotonicity of preferences   Response time 
Certainty group Case study 1 Case study 2 
  
Case study 1 Case study 2 
  N % N %   Median % speederᵃ Median % speeder 
Constantly uncertain (CU) 77 68.1% NA NA   12.8 27.4% 12.8 23,0% 
Variably uncertain (VU) 68 87.2% NA NA   15.6 16.7% 15.4 22.3% 
Constantly hesitant (CH) 147 68.1% NA NA   14.1 21.8% 14.8 18.9% 
Variably hesitant (VH) 131 90.3% NA NA   16.3 8.9% 16.1 15.8% 
Constantly certain (CC) 127 76.5% NA NA   13.9 16.7% 13.8 18.9% 
Variably certain (VC) 124 94.7% NA NA   15.8 9.2% 17.2 11.8% 
                    
P-value of independence test p<0.0001ᵇ       p<0.0001ᶜ p<0.0001ᵇ p<0.0001ᶜ p=0.080ᵇ 
Total 674 83,0%       14.8 16.8% 15.1 17.8% 
 
NA: not available 
ᵃ Percentage of respondents with a total response time strictly below 10 minutes. 
ᵇ  Chi-square independence test. 






Test of conjecture 4: Choice certainty and internal validity 
  
Internal validity: MNL results 
(homogeneous preferences) 
  
Internal validity: MXL results 
(heterogeneous preferences) 
Certainty group Case study 1 Case study 2 
  
Case study 1 Case study 2 
  N % N %   N % N % 
Constantly uncertain (CU) 4/8 50% 7/10 70%   4/8 50% 7/10 80% 
Variably uncertain (VU) 5/8 63% 8/10 80%   6/8 75% 8/10 80% 
Constantly hesitant (CH) 7/8 88% 9/10 90%   7/8 88% 9/10 80% 
Variably hesitant (VH) 8/8 100% 10/10 100%   8/8 100% 10/10 100% 
Constantly certain (CC) 5/8 63% 8/10 80%   7/8 88% 10/10 100% 
Variably certain (VC) 8/8 100% 9/10 90%   8/8 100% 10/10 100% 
Total 8/8 100% 9/10 90%   8/8 100% 9/10 90% 
 
MNL: Multinomial logit model ; MXL: Mixed multinomial logit model 






Test of conjecture 5: Choice certainty and choice consistency (case study 1) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Attribute Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE) 
Breast cancer mortality -0.749*** (0.148) -0.822*** (0.102) -0.830*** (0.094) -0.837*** (0.097) -0.871*** (0.102) 
False-positive -0.009 (0.005) -0.010* (0.006) -0.014** (0.006) -0.012** (0.006) -0.013** (0.006) 
Overdiagnosis -0.053*** (0.011) -0.058*** (0.007) -0.060*** (0.007) -0.060*** (0.007) -0.063*** (0.007) 
Screening referral (doctor) -0.059*** (0.017) -0.064*** (0.016) -0.066*** (0.014) -0.065*** (0.016) -0.067*** (0.016) 
Travel time -0.033** (0.010) -0.036*** (0.009) -0.040*** (0.009) -0.038*** (0.009) -0.041*** (0.009) 
Number of tests -0.005 (0.047) -0.006 (0.052) -0.057 (0.049) -0.035 (0.050) -0.056 (0.052) 
OOP refunded 0.018 (0.031) 0.019 (0.035) 0.039 (0.036) 0.032 (0.035) 0.047 (0.038) 
OOP €30 -0.014 (0.034) -0.015 (0.038) -0.033 (0.040) -0.03 (0.040) -0.03 (0.042) 
OOP €60 -0.164*** (0.043) -0.180*** (0.041) -0.201*** (0.040) -0.188*** (0.040) -0.224*** (0.042) 
Scale function parametersᵃ                     
Certainty (choice level) 0.015 (0.024) - - - - - - - - 
Response time (overall) - - 0.000 (0.002) - - - - - - 
Constantly uncertain (CU) - - - - -0.233* (0.137) - - - - 
Variably uncertain (VU) - - - - -0.121 (0.139) - - - - 
Constantly hesitant (CH) - ref - - - - ref - - - - 
Variably hesitant (VH) - - - - 0.277*** (0.098) - - - - 
Constantly certain (CC) - - - - -0.504*** (0.184) - - - - 
Variably certain (VC) - - - - 0.508*** (0.095) - - - - 
Mean certainty - - - - - - 0.048 (0.030) 0.068** (0.031) 
SD certainty - - - - - - 0.301*** (0.062) 0.325*** (0.075) 
Mean certainty*SD certainty - - - - - - - - 0.211*** (0.049) 
# observations 6496 6496 6496 6496 6496 
# respondents 812 812 812 812 812 
Log-Likelihood -5951.7455 -5952.6306 -5855.2717 -5906.5256 -5848.2509 
 
ᵃ Scale function estimated from heteroskedastic multinomial logit models. Significance levels: ***<1%, **<5%, *<10% 




Test of conjecture 5: Choice certainty and choice consistency (case study 2) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Attribute Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE) 
Disease risk: 40% lifetime risk of higher 0.330*** (0.066) 0.234*** (0.029) 0.363*** (0.038) 0.471*** (0.091) 0.380*** (0.038) 
Disease risk: 80% lifetime risk or higher 0.398*** (0.071) 0.289*** (0.030) 0.453*** (0.037) 0.580*** (0.101) 0.469*** (0.038) 
Disease risk: 90% lifetime risk or higher 0.379*** (0.071) 0.270*** (0.031) 0.423*** (0.039) 0.537*** (0.097) 0.438*** (0.040) 
Recommended effective medical treatment only -0.026 (0.033) 0.049** (0.019) 0.110*** (0.028) 0.105** (0.044) 0.085*** (0.031) 
Recommended effective medical treatment and 
lifestyle change  0.212*** (0.043) 0.183*** (0.021) 0.279*** (0.028) 0.352*** (0.067) 0.284*** (0.030) 
No recommended treatment or lifestyle change -0.370*** (0.064) -0.162*** (0.024) -0.163*** (0.045) -0.276*** (0.051) -0.225*** (0.036) 
Moderate QOL consequences 0.112*** (0.038) 0.128*** (0.022) 0.224*** (0.030) 0.263*** (0.064) 0.210*** (0.034) 
Severe QOL consequences 0.066* (0.038) 0.107*** (0.021) 0.175*** (0.030) 0.205*** (0.055) 0.168*** (0.034) 
Very severe QOL consequences 0.039 (0.044) 0.082*** (0.024) 0.141*** (0.035) 0.158*** (0.056) 0.130*** (0.039) 
Carrier status 0.481*** (0.073) 0.299*** (0.027) 0.404*** (0.045) 0.563*** (0.087) 0.455*** (0.029) 
Cost -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) 
Scale function parametersᵃ                     
Certainty (choice level) 0.006 (0.022) - - - - - - - - 
Response time (overall) - - 0.025*** (0.004) - - - - - - 
Constantly uncertain (CU) - - - - 0.060 (0.109) - - - - 
Variably uncertain (VU) - - - - 0.018 (0.146) - - - - 
Constantly hesitant (CH) - ref - - - - ref - - - - 
Variably hesitant (VH) - - - - 0.226* (0.136) - - - - 
Constantly certain (CC) - - - - -0.888** (0.397) - - - - 
Variably certain (VC) - - - - 0.238*** (0.092) - - - - 
Mean certainty - - - - - - -0.038** (0.019) -0.007 (0.022) 
SD certainty - - - - - - 0.062 (0.049) 0.118** (0.051) 
Mean certainty*SD certainty - - - - - - - - 0.090*** (0.027) 
# observations 19200 19200 19200 19200 19200 
# respondents 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 
Log-Likelihood -19978,414 -19928,974 -19904,959 -19970,004 -19956,269 
 
ᵃ Scale function estimated from heteroskedastic multinomial logit models.  





Appendix A. Description of choice tasks in the two case studies 
 
Figure A1 
Example of a breast cancer screening DCE choice task (case study 1) 
 
Note: In each choice task, respondents could attain a more detailed presentation of the attributes by 
clicking on the attribute label. 
A more thorough description of attributes and levels is available in (Sicsic et al., 2018) : Women’s 
Benefits and Harms Trade-Offs in Breast Cancer Screening: Results from a Discrete-Choice 
Experiment. Value Health 21, 78–88. doi.org/10.1016/j.jval.2017.07.003 
 
 
Figure A2  
Example of return of genomic information DCE choice task (case study 2) 
 
A more thorough description of attributes and levels is available in (Regier et al., 2015) : Societal 
preferences for the return of incidental findings from clinical genomic sequencing: a discrete-choice 








BC mortality 10 25 30
False-positive 200 50 0
Overdiagnosis 150 10 0
Type of screening referral invitation letter your doctor none
Travel time 10 min 90 min 0 min
Number of tests 18 12 0
Out-of-pocket cost € 60 € 30 € 0
Which option would you choose ? □ □ □
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Attribute     MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE 
Breast cancer mortality β1 < 0   -0.164 -0.412 -1.034*** -1.177*** -0.617*** -1.496*** 
False-positive β2 < 0   0.020 -0.007 -0.026** -0.031** 0.008 -0.024 
Overdiagnosis β3 < 0   -0.014 -0.044* -0.067*** -0.097*** -0.031** -0.102*** 
Screening referral (doctor) β4 = ?   0.023 -0.018 -0.041 -0.070** -0.111*** -0.176*** 
Travel time β5 < 0   0.009 -0.008 -0.065*** -0.072*** -0.002 -0.072*** 
Number of tests β6 < 0   0.179 0.020 -0.105 -0.246* 0.208** -0.150 
OOP refunded β7 > 0ᵃ   -0.026 -0.001 0.026 0.072 0.010 0.340** 
OOP €30 β8 < 0   -0.062 0.013 0.054 -0.072 0.016 -0.251 
OOP €60 β9 < 0   -0.121 -0.019 -0.099 -0.199* -0.181** -0.660*** 
# observations     904 624 1432 1160 1328 1048 
# respondents     113 78 179 145 166 131 
Log-Likelihood     -874.1021 -587.1207 -1281.5399 -959.8106 -1328.3926 -769.4856 
MLE: Maximum likelihood estimates. OOP : out-of-pocket 
Significance levels: ***<1%, **<5%, *<10% 
Coefficients highlighted in red do not have the expected sign. 
ᵃ The β7 coefficient is expected to be positive because the OOP attribute is effect coded, so β7 is interpreted in relation to the mean expected impact of OOP 
over all its levels. A rational woman is expected to experience relatively less disutility of having to advance fees (despite being refunded lately) compared to 





















Attribute MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE 
Breast cancer mortality β1 < 0 -0.235 -0.548 -2.121*** -2.255*** -2.017*** -2.924*** 
False-positive β2 < 0 0.021 -0.014 -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.023 -0.068** 
Overdiagnosis β3 < 0 -0.018 -0.065** -0.135*** -0.170*** -0.096*** -0.192*** 
Screening referral (doctor) β4 = ? 0.029 0.006 -0.067 -0.086* -0.223*** -0.249*** 
Travel time β5 < 0 0.006 -0.013 -0.140*** -0.134*** -0.065 -0.161*** 
Number of tests β6 < 0 0.187 0.050 -0.406** -0.506** 0.160 -0.363 
OOP refunded β7 > 0ᵃ 0.035 0.057 0.058 0.095 0.813* 0.782** 
OOP €30 β8 < 0 -0.135 0.001 0.084 -0.031 -0.749* -0.688* 
OOP €60 β9 < 0 -0.239 -0.071 -0.337 -0.473** -1.255*** -1.407*** 
# observations   904 624 1432 1160 1328 1048 
# respondents   113 78 179 145 166 131 
Log-Likelihood   -719.917 -503.712 -947.689 -809.926 -747.123 -640.202 
MLE: Maximum likelihood estimates. OOP : out-of-pocket. 
Significance levels: ***<1%, **<5%, *<10% 
Coefficients highlighted in red do not have the expected sign. 
ᵃ The β7 coefficient is expected to be positive because the OOP attribute is effect coded, so β7 is interpreted in relation to the mean expected impact of OOP 
over all its levels. A rational woman is expected to experience relatively less disutility of having to advance fees (despite being refunded lately) compared to 






















Attribute     MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE 
40% lifetime risk of higher β1 > 0   0.1353* 0.1007 0.0865* 0.0680 0.0485 -0.0123 
80% lifetime risk or higher β2 > 0   0.0022 -0.0400 0.0998** 0.2105*** 0.1057** 0.1920*** 
90% lifetime risk or higher β3 > 0   -0.0226 0.0776 0.0934** 0.1427*** 0.0274 0.1760*** 
Recommended effective medical treatment only β4 > 0   -0.0373 0.0286 0.0293 0.0384 -0.0039 0.0467 
Recommended effective medical treatment and 
lifestyle change  β5 > 0   0.2000*** 0.1785*** 0.2489*** 0.1835*** 0.2062*** 0.3151*** 
No recommended treatment or lifestyle change β6 < 0   -0.2373*** -0.2746*** -0.3027*** -0.2803*** -0.1899*** -0.3956*** 
Moderate QOL consequences β7 > 0   0.0447 0.1116* 0.1158*** 0.0017 -0.0025 0.0203 
Severe QOL consequences β8 > 0   -0.0437 -0.1152* -0.0518 0.1607*** 0.0464 0.012 
Very severe QOL consequences β9 = ? ᵃ   -0.0107 -0.0792 -0.0692 0.0262 -0.0133 0.0364 
Carrier status β10 > 0   0.1804*** 0.1221*** 0.2599*** 0.1217*** 0.2374*** 0.2945*** 
Cost β11 < 0   -0.0015*** -0.0012*** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0005*** -0.0009*** 
# observations     2016 1504 4640 3440 4224 3376 
# respondents     126 94 290 215 264 211 
Log-Likelihood     -2042.0962 -1527.9215 -4545.3372 -3429.7786 -4082.464 -3429.8822 
 
MLE: Maximum likelihood estimates 
Significance levels: ***<1%, **<5%, *<10% 
Coefficients highlighted in red do not have the expected sign. 
ᵃ There is no clear theoretical assumption concerning the sign of this effect because on the one hand, individuals may want to have information about the risk 





















Attribute's levels     MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE MLE 
40% lifetime risk of higher β1 > 0   0.382* 0.235 0.415*** 0.243** 0.350** 0.627*** 
80% lifetime risk or higher β2 > 0   0.595*** 0.270* 0.755*** 0.931*** 0.923*** 1.178*** 
90% lifetime risk or higher β3 > 0   0.244 0.293** 0.590*** 0.685*** 0.596*** 1.086*** 
Recommended effective medical treatment only β4 > 0   -0.179 -0.056 -0.064 0.005 0.127 0.061 
Recommended effective medical treatment and 
lifestyle change  β5 > 0   0.009 0.101 0.304*** 0.135 0.456*** 0.357*** 
No recommended treatment or lifestyle change β6 < 0   -0.751*** -0.597*** -0.598*** -0.665*** -0.465*** -0.817*** 
Moderate QOL consequences β7 > 0   0.166 0.130 0.190** 0.353*** 0.411*** 0.249** 
Severe QOL consequences β8 > 0   -0.006 -0.264* -0.003 0.530*** 0.281** 0.174* 
Very severe QOL consequences β9 = ? ᵃ   -0.212 -0.267 -0.095 0.259** -0.007 0.194 
Carrier status β10 > 0   0.727*** 0.354*** 0.794*** 0.293*** 0.954*** 0.890*** 
Cost β11 < 0   -0.005*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.002*** 
# observations     2016 1504 4640 3440 4224 3376 
# respondents     126 94 290 215 264 211 
Log-Likelihood     -1016.943 -1197.2052 -2969.3629 -2732.985 -1593.1628 -2252.795 
MLE: Maximum likelihood estimates 
Significance levels: ***<1%, **<5%, *<10% 
Coefficients highlighted in red do not have the expected sign. 
ᵃ There is no clear theoretical assumption concerning the sign of this effect because on the one hand, individuals may want to have information about the risk 




Appendix C. Using mean choice certainty and variability to derive more accurate 
welfare estimates: ex-post calibration strategy based on reweighting 
 
In this Appendix, we propose one strategy to incorporate information on respondent’ choice 
certainty and variability in discrete choice models including an opt-out. First, we present the 
benchmark model used to estimate preferences at the sample level using data from our two 
cases studies. This model can be applied to any DCE including at least 2 alternatives and one 
opt-out. Then, we compare the results of models that differ in the way data are weighted 
based on respondent’ certainty. In our comparison we focus on the precision and the 
magnitude of welfare estimates derived from the choice models. 
 
C.1. Econometric models 
C.1.1. The error components model 
In order to account for the non-independence of the data provided by the same respondent and 
the non-independence of alternatives in choice data including 2 or more alternatives and an 
opt-out, the benchmark model to be estimated is an error component logit (ECL) model 
specified as follows (Scarpa et al., 2005; Train, 2003): 
𝑈𝑛𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑛𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐴|𝐵 + 𝛽
′𝑥𝑗𝑡 + 𝜖𝑛𝑗𝑡    (1𝑎) 
 
Where 𝑈𝑛𝑗𝑡 is the utility individual n derives from choosing alternative j in choice scenario t, 
𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐴|𝐵 is a generic intercept entering the utility function of the two testing (i.e. non opt-
out) alternatives, with 𝛼𝑛 the associated coefficient assumed normally distributed representing 
the individual systematic tendency to choose a testing alternative (e.g., breast cancer 
screening or genomic testing, respectively). Thus 𝛼𝑛 allows accounting for various non-
trading behaviours such as individuals who are always choosing to opt-in (𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐴|𝐵 ≫ 0) 
or individuals who are always choosing to opt-out (𝐴𝑆𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐴|𝐵 < 0).  
The simulated log-likelihood (SLL) of the sample associated to the ECL model is written as: 











Where R is the number of Halton draws used for simulation, 𝛼𝑟 is the rth draw from the 
(normal) distribution of 𝛼𝑛, and 𝑃𝑛(𝛼
𝑟) is the unconditional probability of individual n’s 
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sequence of choices evaluated at the value of the rth draw. These unconditional probabilities 
are then averaged over the R draws, and the SLL is maximized at convergence. 
In can be seen from Eq. (1b) that the SLL can be manipulated to re-weight categories of 
respondents, i.e. give some respondents more influence in the estimation process. The 
weighted simulated log-likelihood (wSLL) function is written as follows: 











With 𝑤𝑛 denoting individual weights that are defined below. 
 
C.1.2. The re-weighting models 
We describe the different weights that enter the expression of SLL function in Eq. (1c). Four 
weighted error component logit (WECL 1 to 4) models are defined by specifying different 𝑤𝑛. 
(𝟏) 𝐖𝐄𝐂𝐋𝟏: 𝒘𝒏 = 𝟏, with n=1.….N denoting each respondent. Each respondent is given an 
equal weight =1. WECL1 collapses with the ECL model presented in Eqs. (1b). 
(𝟐) 𝐖𝐄𝐂𝐋𝟐 : 𝒘𝒏= 𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒚𝒏𝒕̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, where 𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑛𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ denotes the mean certainty of 
respondent n over the T choices.  
(𝟑) 𝐖𝐄𝐂𝐋𝟑: 𝒘𝒏 =  𝝈𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒚,𝒏, where 𝜎𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑦.𝑛 denotes the certainty’s standard deviation 
calculated for respondent n over the T choices. In WECL3, we assume that deliberative 
thinking is an increasing function of choice certainty variability. 
(𝟒) 𝐖𝐄𝐂𝐋 : 𝒘𝒏 =  𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒚𝒏𝒕̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ∗ 𝝈𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒚,𝒏. In line with the results of the HMNL models 
estimated in Section 5 of the paper, we assume that giving more weight to individuals with 
higher mean certainty and certainty variability could reduce response error and thus improve 
the efficiency of the econometric model (i.e., lower standard errors). In WECL4, we assume 
that deliberative thinking is an increasing function of both mean choice certainty and certainty 
variability.  
For all the WECL models, 5000 Halton draws are used to simulate the log-likelihood of the 
sample. Prior to estimating the models, the weights are normalized so that the sum of the 
individual specific weights are equal to the number of respondents in each sample population 
(Regier et al., 2014). The standardization of weights allows for the correct calculation of 
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parameter estimates’ standard errors and also (as sample size remains unchanged) allows for 
inter-model comparisons of weighted simulated log-likelihood (wSLL) at convergence13.  
In case study 1, the ECL model results are used to calculate marginal rates of substitution 
(MRS) between breast cancer mortality and the four other quantitative attributes (false-
positive risk, over-diagnosis risk, travel time, and number of screening tests over a lifetime). 
The four MRS are interpreted as willingness-to-accept (WTA) and represent women’s benefit 
and harm trade-offs. For instance, the MRS between over-diagnosis and breast cancer 
mortality is interpreted as the number of over diagnosed cases women are willing to accept, 
on average, to avoid one breast cancer -related death (Sicsic et al., 2018). In case study 2, the 
ECL model results are used to calculate willingness to pay (WTP) to receive information on 
risk of disease, disease treatability, and carrier status (Regier et al., 2015). 
To investigate the impact of the re-weighting models on statistical efficiency, we first 
compare the standard errors (SEs) and width of the 95 percent confidence interval (95% CI) 
around WTP/WTA estimates in WECL2-4 compared to WECL1 (benchmark model). The 
standard errors provide a direct measure of statistical efficiency and thus precision of welfare 
estimates. We also investigate precision by computing D-error, which is the determinant of 
the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix scaled by the number of estimated parameters. 
D-error estimates that are lower indicate greater model efficiency. We expect: 1) an increase 
in the SEs and D-error in WECL2 (synonymous of lower efficiency) as this model gives 
highest weights to constantly certain individuals who have higher response error, and 2) a 
decrease in the SEs and D-error in WECL3-4 (synonymous of higher efficiency) as these 
models place more weights in respondents who answer the DCE in line with deliberative 
thinking. 
In WECL 3-4, we expect lower WTA estimates (case study 1) and lower WTP estimates (case 
study 2 ), because we give more weight to more thoughtful respondents who may be less 
subject to hypothetical bias (Loomis, 2011; Ready et al., 2010). 
 
                                                 
13 We expect that the wSLL in WECL2 should be higher than that of WECL1 because in WECL2, the 
“constantly certain” individuals are given the highest weights. In section 4, we found that constantly certain 
individuals included a high proportion of individuals with deterministic preferences (e.g. serial non-traders or 
serial non-demanders). It can be seen from Eq. (1b)-(1c) that as the proportion of individuals with more 
deterministic preferences (i.e. with higher 𝑃𝑛) increases, so does the wSLL function. On the contrary, we assume 
that the wSLL in WECL3 to 5 should decrease because individuals with more deterministic preferences (higher 




C.2. Results of the re-weighting models 
C.2.1. Case study 1 
The results of the WECL models (WTA, SEs and 95%CI) estimated from case study 1 are 
presented in Table C1. As expected, the SLL increases in WECL2 compared to WECL1 
(benchmark model). This is because we place more weight on individuals with more 
deterministic preferences (the “constantly certain”) thus increasing the predictive value of the 
model, whereas the SLL decreases in WECL3-4 as a result of giving lower weights to 
respondents with more deterministic preferences. 
The D-error and the SEs around two WTA estimates (namely, travel time and number of 
screening tests) are higher in WECL2 compared to WECL1, which is consistent with our 
theoretical predictions. In WECL 3 and 4, the SEs of all WTA estimates are lower as is the D-
error, which is synonymous of higher statistical precision. The model with greatest impact on 
statistical efficiency is WECL4. In WECL4, statistical efficiency improvements range from 
23% to 69%. These improvements are particularly important for two WTA measures, false-
positive results and screening tests: there is a 41% decrease in the SEs for WTA false-
positives and a 69% decrease in the SEs for WTA screening tests. 
In WECL3 and 4, there is a decrease in the WTA estimates for false-positives and screening 
tests. In WECL1, women are willing to accept on average 50.27 false-positives and 9.89 
additional screening tests to save one (statistical) life from breast cancer, compared to 43.74 (-
13%) false-positives and 6.38 (-35%) screening tests in WECL4.  
 
C.2.2. Results of the re-weighting models (case study 2) 
The results of the WECL models (WTP, SEs and 95%CI) estimated from case study 2 are 
presented in Table C2. The results are in line with a-priori expectations and consistent with 
those from case study 1. The SLL increases in WECL2 compared to WECL1, and decreases 
in WECL3 and 4. We find the SEs around WTP estimates are all higher (from 7% to 9%) in 
WECL2 compared to WECL1, and the D-error is higher. Conversely, in WECL3 and 4, all 
the SEs around WTP estimates as well as the D-error are lower. WECL 3 provides the 
greatest improvement in statistical efficiency. Compared to case study 1, there is lower impact 
of the re-weighting function on the precision of welfare estimates (with reduction in SEs 
ranging from 2% to 4%), but a higher impact on the overall statistical efficiency as measured 
through D-error (with reduction in D-error of 15 to 16%). 
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Similarly to case study 1, we observe higher WTP estimates in WECL2 and lower WTP 
estimates in WECL3-4 for all but one WTP parameter (risk of disease for diseases with 90% 
lifetime risk or higher). The reduction in WTP are largest in WECL3. For instance, the 
individuals are willing to pay on average $390.53 to have information on risk of disease 
affecting his/her family (carrier status) in WECL1 as compared to $345.31 (-12%) in 
WECL4. 
In both case studies, when we followed current practice and re-weighted to favour 
respondents with higher mean certainty, we found detrimental impacts on both the precision 
and plausibility of welfare estimates. However, including certainty variability in the re-
weighting function improved the precision of welfare estimates and decreased the 
willingness-to-pay (accept) estimates. As willingness-to-pay are usually overestimated in 
stated preference research (Blumenschein et al., 2001; Morrison and Brown, 2009; Murphy et 
al., 2005), this would suggest our ex-post calibration strategy effectively reduced hypothetical 
bias. However, caution is needed in interpreting this result due to the absence of data on 
revealed preference. At least, our results indicate that the re-weighting functions based on 
certainty variability provided more plausible welfare estimates. 
 
 
